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Case Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN
COMMERCE-A State Tax, Although Consistent with Commerce
Clause Requirements for Interstate Commerce, May Not Be Ap-
plied Unilaterally to Foreign Commerce. Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 47 U.S.L.W. 4477 (U.S. April 30, 1979)
(No. 77-1378).
In 1972, six Japanese shipping companies brought suit against
the City and County of Los Angeles in the Superior Court for
the County of Los Angeles1 seeking a refund judgment for Cali-
fornia ad valorem property taxes they had paid under protest. The
tax had been levied on the companies' shipping containers which
were physically present in the county's taxing jurisdiction on the
March 1 lien date during 1970, 1971, and 1972.'
The shipping companies transport cargo by packing it into large
metal shipping containers of uniform dimensions. These containers
are then loaded onto specially designed ships for transportation
over international waters to foreign ports. At these ports facilities
exist to store and maintain the containers and, finally, unload them
as necessary. They stand idle at these facilities until they are packed
with cargo, loaded onto the ships and transported back to Japan.
The taxpayers' containers were never permanently within the coun-
ty's taxing jurisdiction, but were there for an average stay of less
than three weeks awaiting either repair or the loading or unload-
ing of cargo. Otherwise, they were in constant transit, and were
' The six shipping companies are incorporated under the laws of Japan, and
they have their principal places of business and commercial domiciles in that
country. These companies operate ocean shipping vessels designed to accommo-
date large shipping containers; the vessels and containers, owned by the appel-
lants, have Japan as their home port, and are used exclusively as carriers to
transport cargo in foreign commerce. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
47 U.S.L.W. 4477, 4478 (U.S. April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378).
'Under CAL. REv. & TAX CODE §§ 117, 405, 2192 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979),
any property present in California on the "lien date" of March 1 is subject to
an ad valorem property tax. During the three years in question, the county
levied property taxes in an amount exceeding $550,000 based on the assessed
value of the containers at each "lien date." 47 U.S.L.W at 4478.
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exclusively involved in foreign commerce except for some intra-
state and interstate transportation of cargo necessary as a con-
tinuation of international voyages.' All of the companies' shipping
containers were subject to property taxes in Japan, while Ameri-
can commercial shippers who owned similar containers appearing
intermittently in Japan during the course of international commerce
were not subject to a property tax in that country.4
The trial court found that tax apportionment between a United
States authority and a foreign sovereign was unworkable since no
judicial body existed with the power to enforce the apportionment
formula; the end result would be multiple taxation of the inter-
national carrier involved, a violation of the commerce clause.'
The trial court adhered to the "home port" doctrine and awarded
judgment in the taxpayers' favor.' The California Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court,' and the California Supreme Court affirmed
the reversal,' rejecting the "home port" doctrine. After these ad-
verse rulings, the taxpayers appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, challenging the California tax law as unconstitutional. Held:
A state tax, although consistent with commerce clause requirements
for interstate commerce, may not be applied unilaterally to foreign
commerce.
I. THE "HOME PORT" DOCTRINE V. APPORTIONED TAXATION
The Constitution, under the commerce clause,' affords a car-
'Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d 254,
141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977).
447 U.S.L.W. at 4478.
5See Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d
11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
'A vessel's home port is the jurisdiction wherein the vessel maintains its
registration, is in fact domiciled, and is actually subject to taxation. The "home
port" doctrine describes the view held in the past by federal courts that "vessels
which are instrumentalities of foreign commerce and engaged in foreign com-
merce can be taxed in their home port only." 47 U.S.L.W. at 4478. The vessel
can be taxed in no other port where it docks temporarily. Id.
7 The opinion of the Superior Court is not officially reported. 47 U.S.L.W.
at 4478 n.2.
8 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 3d 562, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1976).
' Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d 254,
141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977). For its official opinion, the California Supreme
Court adopted a slightly revised version of the Court of Appeal opinion.
10 "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign
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rier" who transports goods across state boundaries or between
the United States and another country some protection from state
taxation. A state does have an interest in deriving revenue from
a foreign or interstate carrier that uses available services within
that state's jurisdiction; the Supreme Court's gradual recognition
of this interest has led to a loosening of exclusive federal control
over the power to tax." This loosening, however, has occurred
primarily when the subject has been interstate commerce, with the
Court saying little about a state's power to tax in connection with
foreign commerce."3 The distinction between foreign and inter-
state commerce and the state's right to tax each was unclear prior
to Japan Line; previous case law sheds little light on why the
Court chose to limit a state's power to tax foreign commerce
while it allowed the state to tax interstate commerce.
A. The Supreme Court's Development of the "Home Port" Doctrine
The "home port" doctrine, as first enunciated by the Court in
1854 in Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co."' originally granted
to the domiciliary state, and denied to all other jurisdictions, the
right to levy a property tax at full value on a vessel used in inter-
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ..... U.S.
CONST. art. I, S 8.
11 As used in this casenote, the terms "carrier" and "instrumentalities of foreign
commerce" generally refer to any foreign-owned and domiciled ocean-going
vessel or aircraft that travels international routes exclusively during its course
of business. Even though the decision in Japan Line deals with ocean-going
cargo containers, the fact that the Supreme Court uses the above terms as well
as citing cases with both aircraft and ocean-going vessels in issue points to
the applicability of the Japan Line holding to both admiralty and aviation law.
"See text accompanying note 32 infra.
"See text accompanying note 33 infra.
1'58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854) (California not allowed to levy a property
tax on a New York-owned and registered vessel operating between New York
ports and ports of other states, including California). In that case the Court said:
[Tihe domicile of a vessel .... or home port, is the port at which
she is registered, . . . which must be the nearest to the place where
the owners or operators reside. . . .We are satisfied that the State
of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose
of taxation, they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so
as to become incorporated with the other personal property of the
State; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and
commerce, with their situs at the home port, where the vessels
belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the
capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid.
Id. at 596-600.
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state or foreign commerce that used the open seas as a passage-
way between ports."9 No specific constitutional basis for the doc-
trine was given in Hays." Sixteen years later, in St. Louis v. Wig-
gins Ferry Co., the doctrine was extended beyond ocean routes to
include interstate commercial vessels that traveled exclusively on
inland waters.' In Morgan v. Parham" the Court decided that the
doctrine was not dependent upon actual taxation in the home port.
At this point the purpose behind the doctrine was not the risk of
multiple taxation, a burden upon commerce and a violation of the
commerce clause, but a concept of exclusive federal jurisdiction
once an instrumentality of commerce left its home port for inter-
national waters.'9
Until 1890, the type of route traveled (interstate and interna-
tional water routes as opposed to intrastate water routes) was the
most important factor in determining the applicability of the "home
port" doctrine. As technology provided new ways to move com-
merce, however, the mode of transportation used to move goods
became a key factor in the Court's handling of the doctrine. Pull-
man's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvanid° illuminated the dis-
tinction between railroad rolling stock and other vessels of in-
terstate commerce. Travel over land, with repeated crossings
over various states and no fixed situs,"' is completely different
1Id.
'
9 The court relied neither on the commerce clause nor upon the due process
clause (the case was decided in 1854). Instead, the doctrine arose from the
common law jurisdiction to tax personal property, in full, at the domicile of
the owner. 47 U.S.L.W. 4477, 4479.
778 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870).
18 83 U.S. 471 (1872).
" See id. at 478. The rule in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299
(1851), states that the commerce clause does not prohibit the states from
regulating commerce except in those fields wherein the federal Congress has
acted or those fields which admit only of one uniform system. 53 U.S. at
299. The Court felt that commerce carried out over international routes and
therefore the "home port" doctrine fell into the category of uniform federal
regulation. Noting that up to this time there was a lack of congressional
action on the subject, the Court in Cooley stated that "[w]hatever subjects
of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system,
or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress." 53 U.S. at 319. The Court felt that even
though Congress had not legislated extensively on this subject, that body still
was given the power to do so; it therefore should make use of it. Id.
20 141 U.S. 18 (1890).
21 " 'Situs' . . . , for tax purposes . . . means no more than the state wherein
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than travel in ships that have a home port and touch other
ports only temporarily as they proceed along their international
routes. The Court stated that the practical differences between
the two modes of transportation gave rise to different constitu-
tional powers of state and federal governments, with international
carriers via water being regulated by Congress since these water-
ways were routes of communication and commerce with other na-
tions." It is at this point that the theory of taxation by "apportion-
ment"' developed for the interstate railroads, but the "home port"
doctrine remained intact and applied to all vessels using interna-
tional and interstate water routes.24
In 1948, the Court further narrowed the applicability of the
"home port" doctrine simultaneously with its growing acceptance
of taxation by apportionment. In Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co.' the Court extended a state's ability to tax interstate travel
by including vessels traveling exclusively on inland water routes
with the already taxed railroad cars, finding no difference between
the two modes of transportation." The tax in issue was a Louisiana
apportioned tax on tugs, barges, and other river vessels that were
domiciled in another state."' The court removed applicability of the
"home port" doctrine from interstate water routes, while explicitly
declining to apply its holding to international water routes."8 As
the Court explained in Ott, the "home port" doctrine had been up-
held previously because the question of apportionment had never
been raised.' Even though St. Louis had been overruled, the "home
the personal property is physically present must have a sufficient contact or re-
lationship with the property in order to form in fairness a basis for taxing it."
Cady v. Alexander Constr. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 236, 107 N.W.2d 267, 270 (1961).
See Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
-2141 U.S. 18 (1890).
23 The "apportionment" doctrine of taxation enables a jurisdiction through
which an interstate carrier passes to levy some property tax on that carrier. Vari-
ous formulae exist to ensure that the vehicle pays a tax that is apportioned
among the taxing jurisdictions, theoretically never being taxed at more than
full value. This avoids the possibility of multiple taxation and a per se com-
merce clause violation. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199
U. S. 194 (1905); American Refrigerator Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1898).
- 141 U.S. 18 (1890).
336 U.S. 169 (1948).
2Id. at 174.
2
7 Id. at 171-72 n.2.
"1 See note 30 inIra.
28 336 U.S. at 173.
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port" doctrine was still alive if the vessel traveled on international
waters. Ott was the last time that the Supreme Court considered
the "home port" doctrine prior to Japan Line.
B. The Commerce Clause and State Taxation
Notwithstanding the contention that an international carrier
should be taxed only at its home port, the question still remains
whether a state via taxation has the power at all to regulate inter-
state or foreign commerce when the commerce clause on its face
seems to delegate that power solely to the federal government.
With Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,1 the Supreme Court
had partially answered this question, allowing a state to tax inter-
state commerce provided that certain criteria were met.' Com-
plete Auto represents the culmination of a more practical and
unified approach by the Supreme Court under the commerce
clause to determine the validity of a state's power to regulate
interstate commerce.' Examining the history behind Complete
Auto's affirmation of the state power to regulate interstate com-
merce allows some insight as to whether a state enjoys the same
power over foreign commerce.
Prior to the drafting of the commerce clause, the framers of
the Constitution expressed the notion that interstate and foreign
commerce should be immune from state taxation.' In Gibbons v.
Ogden,' Justice Marshall defined the premise from which all com-
merce clause analysis was to proceed:
What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to pre-
scribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the constitution .... [T]he power of
0 Id. at 173-74. In Ott the Court stated: "We do not reach the question of
taxability of ocean carriage but confine our decision to transportation on inland
waters." Id. Therefore, the major factor determining the applicability of the
"home port" doctrine again became the vessel's choice of route.
31430 U.S. 274 (1977).
32Id.
121 How. L.J. 661 (1978).
3 See generally W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the
Supreme Court. 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62
VA. L. REV. 149 (1976).
-22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Congress to regulate over commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it
would be in a single government, having in its constitution the
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States.'
The Supreme Court applied the principle that purely interstate
commerce was immune from state taxation until 1938, when in
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue" ' the Court decided that
the commerce clause was intended to forbid multiple taxation or
discrimination against interstate commerce, thereby removing the
blanket prohibition of state taxation of interstate commerce.'
The Court said that, "It was not the purpose of the commerce
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their
just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost
of doing the business."' The state tax was allowed for the addi-
tional reason that it did not involve a risk "of cumulative burdens
not imposed on local commerce.""
The theory that a state tax should not create multiple tax
burdens nor discrimination while otherwise allowing the state to
tax interstate commerce was used by the Court to sustain several
state taxes on some phase of interstate commerce. 1 In 1951, how-
ever, in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,41 a state tax
on the privilege of doing business in the state was deemed un-
constitutional per se even though the tax was non-discriminatory,
'Id. at 196-97.
37 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (sales tax on the privilege of doing business in New
Mexico).
"I Id. at 254.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 256. In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 87-88
(1948), the Court upheld a Mississippi excise tax on the "privilege of exercising
corporate functions within the State" because the tax was not discriminatory,
the amount of the tax was reasonable, the tax was properly apportioned, and
there was no possibility of multiple taxation. Justice Reed drew a distinction
between a tax on "the privilege of exercising corporate functions within the
State" and a tax on "the privilege of doing interstate business," the latter being
unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
4t Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1938) (state ad valorem
property taxes); Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Corpus & Taxation, 298
U.S. 553 (1936) (franchise taxes); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S.
165 (1932) (electrical generation excise tax); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,
274 U.S. 284 (1927) (gas production excise tax).
-340 U.S. 602 (1951).
1980] .565
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
fairly apportioned and did not result in multiple burdens on the
taxpayer. The major objection to the tax was that "[the states]
delegated to the United States the exclusive power to tax the
privilege to engage in interstate commerce when they gave Con-
gress the power '[to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States . . .' "" As Justice Frankfurter stated in
Freeman v. Hewit, "What makes the tax invalid is the fact that
there is interference by a state with the freedom of interstate com-
merce."" It was felt that interstate commerce had a "free trade"
.immunity from state taxation.4
Complete Auto reversed Spector. In question was a Mississippi
tax on the "privilege of engaging or continuing in business or
doing business within this state.. . ." The appellant auto company
maintained that its business within Mississippi was an integral
part of interstate commerce, and this tax on the privilege of doing
business was, per se unconstitutional under Spector." The Court
in Complete Auto, however, said that even a tax on the privilege
of doing business would be sustained against a commerce clause
challenge as long as the activity taxed had a sufficient nexus with
the state, and the tax itself did not discriminate against interstate
commerce, was fairly apportioned, and related to services pro-
vided by the state." The Court in Complete Auto reexamined all
the prior doctrines regarding a state's power to tax interstate com-
merce and enunciated a basis for constitutional analysis under the
commerce clause of a state tax on interstate commerce. Inter-
state commerce was protected without creating a blanket prohi-
bition against taxation by a separate state.
43 Id. at 608.
- 329 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1946).
-430 U.S. 274, 278 (1977).
"Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 275 (1977), quoting
from Miss. CoDE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1972). The tax was measured by the gross
receipts from the business.
47 The company's trucks were in Mississippi for an average time of 48 hours.
430 U.S. at 279.
48 430 U.S. at 277-78. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602 (1951).
- 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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II. JAPAN LINE, LTD. V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELESO
The Supreme Court in Japan Line was faced with the problem
of deciding whether a state unilaterally could secure tax revenue
from an exclusively foreign carrier, when the Constitution on its
face vests the power to govern foreign commerce solely with the
federal government. This problem had never been posed directly
to the Court before, and the parties' arguments reflected two ra-
tional lines of thought having historically strong legal back-
grounds. There was little certainty as to exactly which path the
Court would follow.
The shipping companies claimed that even though the "home
port" doctrine had been somewhat eroded over the years, it still
remained applicable when the taxed property was foreign-owned,
foreign-domiciled, and operated exclusively over international
routes. The county, however, maintained that the "home port"
doctrine had been abandoned," and since apportioned taxation by
states of interstate carriers had been affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, foreign instrumentalities could also be taxed using
a non-discriminatory apportionment scheme.
Justice Blackmun in Japan Line chose not to follow exactly
the courses offered in either the taxpayers' or the county's argu-
ment. Recognizing that the "home port" doctrine had no consti-
tutional basis, and that the doctrine itself had lost its efficacy in
the light of the Supreme Court cases which had been abandoning
it, to reaffirm the questionable doctrine as a rule of law would
be theoretically unsound. Following the "home port" doctrine as
stated in Hays," logically, would bar any taxation by a non-
domiciliary state of a carrier that was using that state's services,
allowing only the home port state to tax the carrier. It would not
matter if the carrier were domestically or foreign-owned or en-
gaged in domestic or international commerce." Blackmun specific-
ally limits the Japan Line holding to "instrumentalities of com-
merce that are owned, based, or registered abroad and that are
- 47 U.S.L.W. 4477 (U.S. April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378).
5 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
'58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
5347 U.S.L.W. at 4479.
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used exclusively in international commerce,"" and summarily re-
jects the "home port" doctrine.'
The Court also rejected the contention that the California stat-
ute, since it met the four-fold Complete Auto test, should be
upheld as constitutional." The problem was that the taxed con-
tainers were not involved in purely interstate commerce, but were
instrumentalities of foreign commerce. Since Congress' power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign nations"' was the issue presented
here, something more was required in the Court's estimation than
the four-fold test for state taxation of interstate commerce pre-
sented in Complete Auto. The Court felt that the real and great
risk of multiple taxation coupled with the necessity that the United
States regulate foreign trade in a uniform manner was an impor-
tant consideration when evaluating a state's power to tax foreign
commerce.
It has long been held that multiple taxation of an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce may violate the commerce clause."
By not allowing the instrumentality to be subjected to a tax be-
yond its full value, and apportioning the tax among the various
jurisdictions in a fair manner so as to not go above this full value,
the risk of multiple taxation and any commerce clause objection
on this point theoretically would have been eliminated." The
" The Court in Japan Line states:
There is no need in this case to decide currently the broad propo-
sition and whether mere use of international routes is enough,
under the 'home port doctrine' to render an instrumentality immune
from tax in a nondomiciliary State. . . .Accordingly, we do not
reach questions as to the taxability of foreign-owned instrumentali-
ties engaged in interstate commerce, or of domestically-owned
instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce.
47 U.S.L.W. at 4480.
"Id.
"Id.
"' U.S. CONST. art I, 5 8, cl. 3.
"1Note this language in footnote 17 of Japan Line: "Because California's
tax in this case creates multiple taxation in fact, we have no occasion here to
decide under what circumstances the mere risk of multiple taxation would in-
validate a state tax, or whether the risk would be evaluated differently in foreign,
as opposed to interstate commerce." 47 U.S.L.W. at 4482 n.17. See Evco v.
Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972); Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962);
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1948); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 304
(1938).
""The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportion-
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problems of multiple taxation can be avoided when the appor-
tionment formulae can be enforced; this power of enforcement
exists between taxing entities who must answer to the courts of
the United States.' Such enforcement of apportionment cannot
be guaranteed, however, when a foreign government is one of the
parties levying a tax; these nations have by right and custom the
power to tax carriers within their jurisdiction at full value." Even
the United States Supreme Court cannot ensure apportionment of
taxation at not exceeding full value between the various taxing
entities within the United States and its foreign trading partners."
No judicial mechanism exists that has this power. Even though a
tax may be apportioned fairly to allow for services rendered by a
state to a taxpayer who has established his presence there within
that jurisdiction, a foreign taxpayer suffers the risk of multiple
taxation between its foreign domicile and the state in which it
does business, a burden the Court is clearly powerless to deal
with, and one which is clearly repugnant to the commerce clause.'
Uniformity in federal policy is essential when dealing with
foreign commerce," a uniformity that can be achieved only by
vesting the power to regulate foreign commerce exclusively with
the federal government.' As the Court points out, this desire for
ment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile
* . . otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate operation." Standard
Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952).
60336 U.S. 169 (1948).
61 Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 3d 11,
17, 17 n.3, 363 P.2d 25, 28, 28 n.3, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28, 28 n.3, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 899 (1961). Foreign aircraft engaged in international commerce are subject
to taxation in their country of origin, and this taxation is on an unapportioned
basis.
"247 U.S.L.W. at 4481.
"6 Id.
"Id. "In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and
trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified
and adequate national power." Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S.
48, 59 (1933).
"The Court notes at this point that even though the federal government
draws its power to regulate commerce with other nations and between the
States from the same phrase within the commerce clause, the federal govern-
ment is given more latitude in regulating foreign commerce. "Laws which concern
the exterior relations of the United States with other nations and governments
are general in their nature, and should proceed exclusively from the legislative
authority of the nation." Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465,
482 (1888). Power of Congress over foreign commerce is "exclusive and abso-
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uniformity has been evidenced by international agreements," and
consistently distinguishes ocean-going traffic and aviation from
other methods of interstate commerce." The California tax would
defeat this federal uniformity in a variety of ways which the Court
feels are real and probable hazards that must be avoided. For
instance, there are few methods to avoid disputes over apportion-
ment formulae between a foreign government and a state which has
levied an apportioned tax on a foreign carrier." Retaliation against
American-owned international carriers doing business with foreign
governments is a very real threat, one that would be avoided by
invalidating the tax." In addition, the Court notes that the Cali-
lute." Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904); regulation "must of
necessity be national in its character" when it affects "a subject which concerns
our international relations, in regard to which foreign nations ought to be con-
sidered and their rights respected." Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S.
259, 273 (1875).
"As one commentator has stated: "The Customs Convention on Containers,
signed by both Japan and the United States, is an attempt to streamline handling
procedures for the shipping containers in an effort to promote its more efficient
use." Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 507 (1974).
7 "Vehicles of commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication
with other nations, the regulation of them is assumed by the national legislature."
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 24 (1841) (quoting
Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1874)).
" There is a strong risk of multiple taxation that would result from overlap-
ping formulae for appointment. See generally Note, Developments in the Law--
Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV.
953 (1962).
09 In its brief, Appellant argues that:
On February 17, 1978, representatives of the Government of
Japan conferred with the United States Department of State ... to
express concern over the imposition by California of property taxes
upon the containers of the Taxpayer. An aide memoire confirming
such concern was delivered by the Government of Japan to the
State Department on March 27, 1978.
In addition, the governments of Denmark, France, Finland, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Norway and the Netherlands jointly communicated with the Depart-
ment of State that "they shared the concern expressed by the Government of
Japan regarding the imposition of personal property tax upon foreign owned
containers" and that this act was viewed "with considerable apprehension." This
apprehension by foreign governments was not only directed at the property tax
on containers, but also at the proposed personal property tax upon aircraft
owned by foreign persons and used exclusively in foreign commerce. A letter
filed by the Government of Mexico with the Department of State on June 15,
1978, related extreme protest over the proposed aircraft tax, citing that the
United States' treaty obligations would be contravened because Article 24 of
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8632-C/968, allows
foreign aircraft to enter the country temporarily free of duty. Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and
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fornia tax would thwart efforts by the governments of the United
States, Japan, and its other trading partners to handle containers
specifically in a uniform manner."0 The Court eventually states that
when other states follow California's example, the foreign instru-
mentalities will be subject to varying degrees of taxation depend-
ing on which port they enter. 1 This would destroy any possibility
of uniformity, preventing the federal government from "speaking
with one voice."
The Court's interpretation of the commerce clause and its
application to instrumentalities of foreign commerce is consistent
with recent precedent set for evaluating state and local regula-
tions. As set out in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages"t and Depart-
ment of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,"
the validity of state or local regulation must be considered within
the context of the purposes sought to be achieved through the
commerce clause:
The Framers of the Constitution thus sought to alleviate three
main concerns .... The Federal Government must speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations, and tariffs, which
might affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the
States consistently with that exclusive power; import revenues were
to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government and
harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard
States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from levy-
ing taxes on citizens of another State by taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as
favorably geographically.'
the United Kingdom, all parties to the Convention, filed similar letters. Specifically
threatened is the agreed-upon notion of "reciprocal exemption from duties" for
temporarily entering another country party to the convention. Brief for Appellant
at 10-11, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 47 U.S.L.W. 4477 (U.S.
April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378).
" The Customs Convention on Containers allows any shipping container tem-
porarily imported from a foreign country to be admitted into all signing coun-
tries free of all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of importation.
47 U.S.L.W. 4477, 4482 (U.S. April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378).
'1 Id.
423 U.S. 276 (1976).
'3435 U.S. 734 (1978).
14Although 62.4% of passengers between the United States and foreign
countries are U.S. citizens, domestic airlines enjoyed only 51.8% of the market
in 1960 (compared with 74.7% of the market in 1950). It is claimed that "[o]ne
foreign airline operating from the U.S. west coast to Europe .... diverts more
than $3,000,000 annually from U.S. transcontinental airlines-an amount greater
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As Japan Line states, the commerce clause's purpose was to elimi-
nate the possibility of multiple taxation and ensure uniformity in
the regulation of commerce. Even if these concerns do not arise
in the interstate context, they certainly do when the California
tax is applied to foreign commerce.
III. CONCLUSION
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether or not a
state has the right to levy a property tax unilaterally on an instru-
mentality of foreign commerce, and it found the basis for denying
this power in the commerce clause. In finding a constitutional
basis for denying this power, the Court put an outer limit on the
ability of a state to tax on an "apportionment" and "non-
discriminatory" theory of taxation. The foreign owners of ships or
airplanes that travel international routes exclusively and which are
taxed in their foreign domicile have a defensible position against
multiple taxation by states, no longer having to rely on the "home
port" doctrine. Most importantly, the federal government can act
in determining foreign commercial policy in a uniform manner
without the threat of a state unilaterally intervening. The various
trade agreements entered into by the United States with its trad-
ing partners have been strengthened since neither party need fear
encroachment from a state taxing authority.
Japan Line does nothing to weaken the Complete Auto an-
alysis for state taxation; it simply sets out a second test, the major
criterion being what type of commerce a state is attempting to
tax. Complete Auto refers to a state's power to tax interstate com-
merce, while Japan Line expands the test to include secured uni-
formity and elimination of the risk of multiple taxation when the
subject is the state's power to tax foreign commerce. The type of
tax levied could be a major criterion, but neither Complete Auto
nor Japan Line indicated that it is. At issue in Complete Auto
was a use and sales tax on the "privilege of doing business,"
while California in Japan Line was levying an ad valorem property
tax. However, the Court indicates that if the California property
than the entire net profit of the domestic trunklines in 1960." Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., May 1, 1961, at 69-70.
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tax had been tested in the interstate commerce area rather than
the foreign commerce area, the statute would have been held con-
stitutional. It is what is being taxed that is in issue, not the type
of tax, property, use, sales, income, or otherwise.
An important question still remains, however, in regards to a
state's participation in international commerce. The foreign instru-
mentalities do partake of services from the state, be it at the air-
port or dock, and the states must be paid for these services in some
manner.' Domestic carriers pay their own way."' Since Japan Line,
a state's only recourse is to the United States government for re-
imbursement. The constitutional demands of the commerce clause
have been elevated over the necessity of a state obtaining revenue
for services rendered to a foreign commercial carrier; the Court has
created an area of tax immunity for foreign carriers that Complete
Auto denied to interstate carriers. It seems unfair to a domestic
carrier that it must pay for the services it uses, while the foreign
carrier does not; Japan Line necessarily puts Congress in the posi-
tion of removing this seeming burden on domestic commerce.
Robert B. Luther
7' Brief for Appellant at 8, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 47
U.S.L.W. 4477 (U.S. April 30, 1979) (No. 77-1378).
76 Id. at 9.
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